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SCHWAB V. REILLY: AN EXEMPTION FROM 
THE DUTY TO OBJECT TO EXEMPTIONS 
Anna Do* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), upon the filing 
of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the debtor’s assets automatically 
become property of the bankruptcy estate.1 The assets are then 
liquidated in order to pay the debtor’s prepetition creditors.2 In 
exchange, the debtor is discharged from his or her debts owed and is 
afforded a “fresh start.”3 However, § 522 of the Code permits a 
debtor to exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate.4 
Exemptions are critical because they allow debtors to rise out of 
bankruptcy with enough assets to achieve a fresh start.5 So long as a 
party in interest does not object to the claim of exemption within 
thirty days of the conclusion of the meeting of creditors, such 
property is protected from the trustee’s and creditors’ reach.6 
In 1992, in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz7 the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
* J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I wish to thank Professor Anne Wells for her 
guidance on this Comment. I would also like to thank the Honorable Samuel L. Bufford and his 
former law clerk, Daria K. Boxer, for their support in my endeavors and for instilling in me the 
desire to learn about bankruptcy law. 
 1. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006). 
 2. See id. § 704(a)(1). 
 3. See id. § 727(b); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934), superseded by statute, 11 
U.S.C. §§ 522, 541. By allowing creditors to take the debtor’s prepetition assets and discharging 
the debtor from his or her prepetition claims, the debtor is given “a new opportunity in life and a 
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing 
debt.” Id. at 244. 
 4. When property is declared exempt, it is not taken into account for purposes of counting 
up the debtor’s assets because it is no longer property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b), 542. 
 5. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 522.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th 
ed. 2010) (“A fundamental component of an individual debtor’s fresh start in bankruptcy is the 
debtor’s ability to set aside certain property as exempt from the claims of creditors. Exemption of 
property, together with the discharge of claims, lets the debtor maintain an appropriate standard 
of living as he or she goes forward after the bankruptcy case.”). 
 6. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). 
 7. 503 U.S. 638 (1992). 
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addressed the issue of whether a trustee must object to a debtor’s 
§ 522 claim of exemption within the thirty-day window required by 
Rule 4003 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Rule 
4003”).8 The Court held that the trustee had to object within the 
thirty-day window in order to retain proceeds of a lawsuit that 
exceeded the amount allowed by the Code.9 Since that decision, there 
has been a circuit split on the issue of what constitutes a claim of 
exemption to which an interested party must object.10 Some courts 
have held that trustees have no duty to object to a claim of 
exemptions when the dollar value listed is within the range that the 
Code allows.11 Other courts have held that trustees must timely 
object to such dollar-value exemptions if they wish to later sell the 
property at issue.12 The courts in the former group reason that the 
debtor exempted only “an interest” in the property and that the 
exemption was, therefore, not objectionable so long as the dollar 
value was within the range permitted by the Code.13 Courts in the 
latter group adopt the view that the debtor exempted the property 
itself by listing its full dollar value.14 Applying the latter group’s 
rationale, debtors could potentially receive a windfall if the dollar 
value listed undervalues the property at issue. 
In Schwab v. Reilly,15 the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the issue 
of whether a trustee must file objections within the thirty-day 
window in order to challenge a debtor’s claim of exemption.16 In 
short, the Court held that if a debtor lists a fixed-dollar value for a 
scheduled exemption of property that is within the statutorily 
allowed exemption amount, a trustee does not have a duty to object 
to the debtor’s claimed exemption within the thirty-day window in 
 
 8. Id. at 639. 
 9. Id. at 642. 
 10. Compare In re Barroso-Herrans, 524 F.3d 341, 344 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that debtor 
exempted partial interests in lawsuits to the extent of the dollar amounts listed), with In re Wick, 
276 F.3d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that debtor only partially exempted options to the 
extent of $3,925 in value, despite valuing the options as “unknown”). 
 11. E.g., In re Wick, 276 F.3d at 416; In re Williams, 104 F.3d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 12. E.g., In re Barroso-Herrans, 524 F.3d at 344; In re Green, 31 F.3d 1098, 1100 (11th Cir. 
1994); In re Anderson, 377 B.R. 865, 875 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007). 
 13. E.g., In re Wick, 276 F.3d at 416; In re Williams, 104 F.3d at 690. 
 14. E.g., In re Barroso-Herrans, 524 F.3d at 344; In re Green, 31 F.3d at 1100; In re 
Anderson, 377 B.R. at 875. 
 15. 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). 
 16. Id. at 2657. 
  
Spring 2011]                SCHWAB V. REILLY 1235 
order to later sell that property.17 The Court reasoned that a debtor’s 
claimed exemption for the property’s full dollar value protects only 
that dollar value—that is, an interest in the property—and not the 
property itself. The Court suggested that debtors who intend on 
exempting a property in-kind could list “full fair market value 
(FMV)” or “100% of FMV” rather than a fixed-dollar value as a 
claimed exemption.18 
The outcome in Schwab was in accordance with both the 
language of the exemption-related statutes and their purposes. 
However, there is cause for concern with respect to the Court’s 
suggestion that debtors list an asset’s full fair market value as a 
claimed exemption if they wish to exempt the property itself.19 This 
Comment discusses the implications of the Schwab decision and 
whether the Court strayed from the plain meaning of the statutory 
language by suggesting such a solution. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The debtor in Schwab, Nadejda Reilly, earned a living from her 
one-person catering business.20 When her catering business failed, 
she sought relief by filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.21 William 
Schwab was appointed as the trustee of Reilly’s bankruptcy estate.22 
In accordance with the Code’s requirements, Reilly filed 
schedules listing, among other things, assets she wished to exempt 
from the bankruptcy estate.23 On her Schedule B form,24 Reilly listed 
her catering business equipment as an asset and assigned to it a total 
value of $10,718.25 On her Schedule C form,26 Reilly claimed the 
catering equipment as exempt pursuant to § 522(d)(5) and (6) of the 
 
 17. Id. at 2669. 
 18. Id. at 2668. 
 19. See id. 
 20. In re Reilly, 534 F.3d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. 
Ct. 2652 (2010). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2006). The Bankruptcy Rules provide for standard schedule forms 
on which the debtor lists his or her assets. Debtors are to list their real estate assets on schedule A 
forms, other assets on schedule B forms, and claimed exemptions on schedule C forms. 
 24. FED. R. BANKR. P. Form 6, Schedule B (2005). The Schedule B form requires a debtor to 
state the type of property he or she wishes to claim as exempt and its value. 
 25. In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 174. 
 26. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l); FED. R. BANKR. P. Form 6, Schedule C (2005). 
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Code.27 By listing the property on the Schedule C form, Reilly was 
attempting to exempt the property from the pool of assets that the 
trustee would liquidate to pay creditors.28 Under § 522(d)(6), Reilly 
was able to claim a “tool[s] of the trade” exemption29 for the 
maximum allowable amount of $1,850. Under § 522(d)(5), which 
allows for a miscellaneous or “wildcard” exemption of up to 
$10,718,30 Reilly exempted the equipment and assigned a value of 
$8,868 to it.31 Under the column labeled “Current Market Value of 
Property,” Reilly assigned a total value of $10,718 to the catering 
equipment, and under the column labeled “Value of Claimed 
Exemption” Reilly also listed $10,718.32 
Subsequently an appraiser found that Reilly’s catering 
equipment might be worth as much as $17,200, roughly $7,200 over 
Reilly’s estimate.33 Ordinarily, property exceeding the exemption 
available by statute can be seized and sold by a Chapter 7 trustee if 
“a party in interest” objects to the exemption within thirty days of the 
conclusion of a § 341 creditors’ meeting.34 If no party objects, then 
the property “claimed as exempt . . . is exempt.”35 The trustee in 
Reilly learned of this appraisal prior to the § 341 creditors’ 
meeting—well before the thirty-day window to object closed—but 
did not object.36 
After the thirty days passed, the trustee moved to sell the 
business equipment in order to pay Reilly the amount of her claimed 
exemption, $10,718, and to use the excess to pay Reilly’s creditors.37 
The trustee asserted that on her Schedule C form, Reilly had only 
signaled her intent to exempt a $10,718 interest in her equipment and 
that she was not entitled to retain the excess value of the property as 
it would be a windfall resulting from Reilly’s own undervaluation of 
 
 27. In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 174. 
 28. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). 
 29. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6). 
 30. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). 
 31. In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 175 n.1. 
 32. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2660–61 (2010). 
 33. Id. at 2658. 
 34. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). Generally parties in interest include 
creditors and the trustee. 
 35. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (emphasis added). 
 36. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658 n.2. 
 37. Id. at 2658. 
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the assets.38 Reilly contended that by claiming the equipment’s full 
value on the schedule—that is, by claiming the same amount listed as 
the equipment’s full fair market value—she had put the trustee on 
notice that she was claiming an exemption for the equipment itself.39 
The bankruptcy court denied the trustee’s motion on the ground that 
the property itself was exempt and, therefore, not property of the 
bankruptcy estate for the trustee to auction off.40 
Appealing to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania and subsequently to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit,41 the trustee averred that “neither the Code nor Rule 
4003(b) requires a trustee to object to a claimed exemption where the 
amount the debtor declares as the ‘value of [the debtor’s] claimed 
exemption’ in certain property is an amount within the limits the 
Code prescribes.”42 The trustee contended that only the claimed 
amount listed, $10,718, was subject to the thirty-day window for 
making an objection.43 Accordingly, any remaining interest in the 
property was not exempt and required no objection.44 Both the 
district court and the court of appeal rejected the trustee’s 
argument.45 
The Third Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court in finding 
that, by listing the full value of the property, the debtor had notified 
the trustee of her intent to exempt the property itself.46 Relying 
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor, the court held 
that the trustee’s failure to make a timely objection had entitled 
Reilly to exempt the full value of her equipment, even if that value 
exceeded both the amounts that Reilly actually declared on her 
 
 38. In re Reilly, 534 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. 
Ct. 2652 (2010). 
 39. Reilly also filed a conditional motion to dismiss stating that she would have rather ended 
her bankruptcy proceeding than have had her equipment auctioned off. However, the bankruptcy 
court denied Reilly’s motion to end the bankruptcy case. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658. 
 40. Id. at 2659. 
 41. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), U.S. district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from final judgments, orders, and decrees of the bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006). 
 42. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 43. See id. at 2658. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. at 2659. 
 46. In re Reilly, 534 F.3d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. 
Ct. 2652 (2010). 
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schedules and what the Code permits.47 The court noted that “‘an 
unstated premise’ of Taylor was ‘that a debtor who exempts the 
entire reported value of an asset is claiming the ‘full amount,’ 
whatever it turns out to be.”48 In Taylor, a debtor had “meant to 
exempt the full amount of the property by listing ‘unknown’ as both 
the value of the property and the value of the exemption.”49 
Accordingly, by listing a dollar-value exemption in the amount equal 
to the listed value of the equipment, Reilly had put the trustee on 
notice that she intended to exempt the property in-kind.50 
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision, finding 
that, in claiming a dollar value as exempt, Reilly had exempted only 
an interest in the equipment, and not the equipment itself.51 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court ruled in a 6–3 majority opinion that the 
trustee was not required to object to the claimed exemption to 
reserve the estate’s right to retain the potential excess value of the 
equipment beyond the amount claimed as exempt.52 The decision 
looks at two important bankruptcy rules: § 522 of the Code and Rule 
4003. The first imposes dollar-value limits on the extent to which a 
debtor can exempt certain types of property.53 The second requires 
that interested parties object to a debtor’s claimed exemptions within 
thirty days after the conclusion of the § 341 creditors’ meeting or 
lose the ability to retain any of that property for the bankruptcy 
estate.54 
The Court accepted the trustee’s argument that it was reasonable 
to infer from the language of the above statutes that the debtor only 
intended to exempt an interest in the equipment worth the amount 
listed rather than an interest in the equipment itself.55 Therefore, 
because Reilly stated the “value of [her] claimed exemption[s]” 
 
 47. Id. at 179. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 178. 
 50. Id. at 174. 
 51. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2666–69 (2010). 
 52. Id. at 2669. 
 53. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2006). 
 54. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1). 
 55. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661–63. 
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within the range that the Bankruptcy Code allows for “property 
claimed as exempt,” it was not objectionable.56 In other words, the 
schedule exempted no greater amount than the statute permitted. 
Accordingly, the trustee was not required to object to the exemptions 
to reserve the estate’s right to retain the potential excess value 
beyond the amount she had claimed.57 The Court viewed Reilly’s 
interpretation of the schedule as “complicated” and “inconsistent 
with the Code.”58 
The Court reasoned that the issue of what constitutes a claimed 
exemption could be resolved by looking to the language of § 522(l).59 
Section 522(l) states in pertinent part: “The debtor shall file a list of 
property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this 
section.”60 The Court pointed out that § 522(l) defines the objection’s 
target as “property debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b).”61 
Subsection (b), in turn, refers to property as specified in subsection 
(d).62 Under subsection (d), there are twelve categories of property 
that a debtor may claim as exempt, most of which are described as 
“an interest” in a property up to a specified dollar amount.63 
Essentially, the subject of an exemption claim is defined as “an 
interest” in an asset, and not the asset itself.64 Therefore, the Court 
reasoned, the value of the claimed exemption should be judged by 
the dollar value the debtor assigns to the interest rather than the value 
assigned to the asset.65 
Based on this definition of what constitutes a “claim of 
exemption,” the trustee had no reason to object to Reilly’s exemption 
claim because its stated dollar value was within the limits allowed by 
 
 56. Id. at 2661–62. 
 57. Id. at 2662. 
 58. Id. at 2660 (noting that Reilly’s interpretation of the schedule required looking at the 
“interplay of various schedule entries” to determine whether the debtor intended to exempt an 
interest in the property or the property itself). 
 59. Id. at 2661. 
 60. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (2006). 
 61. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661. The Court also rejected Reilly’s claim that the latter portion 
of § 522(l) should be dispositive. Id. at 2662. 
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). 
 63. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (“The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $ 2,175 in 
value, in any implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a 
dependent of the debtor.”). 
 64. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661. 
 65. Id. at 2661–62. 
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the Code.66 The Court further justified this interpretation of the 
trustee’s statutory obligation as being consistent with the governing 
Code provisions and the historical treatment of bankruptcy 
exemptions.67 
Furthermore, the Court corrected the court of appeal in its 
interpretation of the Taylor decision, stating that Taylor did not rest 
on what the debtor “meant” to exempt and did not raise an “unstated 
premise” that “a debtor who exempts the entire reported value of an 
asset is claiming the ‘full amount.’”68 The Court explained that 
Taylor holds only that the trustee must object to a claimed exemption 
if the amount the debtor lists as the “value claimed exempt” is not 
within the statutory limit.69 The Court further clarified that Taylor 
focused on whether, looking at the face of the schedules, the trustee 
had a duty to object, rather than framing it as an issue of whether the 
debtor intended to exempt the property’s full value.70 
Unlike Reilly, the debtor in Taylor claimed as exempt the 
proceeds of a lawsuit and listed its value as “unknown,” a value that 
was clearly not within the statutory limit for exemptions.71 The Court 
distinguished Reilly’s situation with that of Taylor’s because the 
trustee for Reilly’s bankruptcy estate had no basis for objecting in 
the first place as the exemption was, on its face, compliant with the 
exemption rules, and there was no way of knowing that the asset 
would appreciate in value beyond the limit.72 Accordingly, the trustee 
in Taylor was required to make a timely objection if he wanted the 
proceeds to be part of the bankruptcy estate, and the failure to timely 
object meant that the property in its entirety was exempt.73 Reilly’s 
claimed amount, on the other hand, was within the statutory limit, so 
no objection to the claimed exemption was required to preserve the 
estate’s entitlement to the value that exceeded that amount.74 
In addition, the Court discussed the role of a “market value 
 
 66. Id. at 2662. 
 67. Id. (referring to the fact that previous forms required the debtor to list the value of the 
claimed exemption without also estimating the market value of the asset). 
 68. Id. at 2666. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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estimate” on a Schedule C form.75 The Court rejected the argument 
that its interpretation of the rules and Schedule C made a debtor’s 
market value estimates superfluous and suggested that those 
estimates are still valuable in helping the trustee identify assets that 
may have value beyond the amount the debtor claims as exempt.76 
Specifically, the trustee can “compare the value of the claimed 
exemption, (which typically represents the debtor’s interest in a 
particular asset) with the asset’s estimated market value, (which 
belongs to the estate subject to any valid exemption) without having 
to consult separate schedules.”77 
Finally, the Court addressed Reilly’s concern regarding the 
ruling’s practical effect—namely, the delay and uncertainty to 
debtors caused by a trustee’s failure to timely object.78 The Court 
stated that if it is important to the debtor to claim the asset itself 
exempt, the debtor may list the “exempt value as ‘full fair market 
value (FMV)’ or ‘100% of FMV,’” which would effectively put a 
trustee on notice to object.79 Absent a timely or successful objection, 
the debtor would thus be entitled to the full fair market value of the 
property claimed as exempt.80 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  What Are Debtors Confronted with After Schwab v. Reilly? 
The Court’s decision in Schwab should ultimately lead to more 
efficient administration of bankruptcy estates—at least for trustees. 
Trustees can now look to a bright-line rule in determining whether 
they should file an objection. Trustees—and courts—need only rely 
on the values expressly listed on the schedules as evidence of an 
exemption’s validity and need not consider the debtor’s intent. Prior 
to Reilly, some trustees made it a practice to file prophylactic 
objections to claimed exemptions.81 Instituting a bright-line rule 
 
 75. Id. at 2663–64. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 2664. 
 78. Id. at 2667. 
 79. Id. at 2668. 
 80. Id. (“If the trustee fails to object, or if the trustee objects and the objection is overruled, 
the debtor will be entitled to exclude the full value of the asset.”). 
 81. Tamara Miles Ogier, Schwab v. Reilly: A Win-Win Decision, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 
2010, at 38, 38. The author, a practicing bankruptcy attorney and trustee, noticed that debtors 
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regarding objections, as the Court did, benefits the administration of 
the bankruptcy estate, as it potentially eliminates such time-
consuming prophylactic objections. 
Debtors, on the other hand, should now be aware of the 
uncertainty that comes with listing a dollar-value claim as exempt, 
especially in situations in which the amount of the asset might have 
an actual value near the maximum exemptible amount.82 However, 
unlike trustees who are repeat players in bankruptcy court, pro se 
debtors are not likely to know the significance of listing a dollar 
value as their claimed exemption.83 In reality, a substantial majority 
of those who file for bankruptcy relief file under Chapter 784 and a 
substantial number of those debtors are pro se.85 A fair application of 
§ 522 and Rule 4003(b) is extremely difficult under the existing 
wording and schedule forms. These ambiguities, though clarified by 
the Court in Schwab, need to be addressed in a manner 
comprehensible to the average debtor. For example, a simple 
amendment to the Schedule C form providing a short explanation 
that listing a dollar value only exempts that specified value and 
nothing more would be sufficient to direct pro se debtors.86 
 
were frequently valuing property at $1 and then claiming a $1 exemption in said property—
arguably attempting to claim the full amount regardless of what the value of the property turned 
out to be. In response, the author made it standard practice to file objections consisting of the 
standard language: 
[N]o exemption referenced herein or taken by the Debtors in their Schedule C shall be 
construed to exempt all of the value or equity in any particular piece of property. The 
amount available to be exempted in any particular piece of property shall be as set 
forth herein or, if not specifically set forth herein, shall be limited to the available 
statutory maximum regardless of ultimate value of the property. 
Id. at 39 n.9. 
 82. See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 83. See id. at 2677 n.15. 
 84. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 REPORT OF STATISTICS REQUIRED BY THE 
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 5 (2009), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2009/ 
2009BAPCPA.pdf (“Approximately 71 percent of [1.4 million bankruptcy petitions], up from 66 
percent in 2008, were filed under chapter 7 . . . .”). 
 85. Susan Block-Lieb, A Comparison of Pro Bono Representation Programs for Consumer 
Debtors, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 37, 41 (1994). 
 86. The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules has already proposed amending the 
Schedule C form in a manner that would permit debtors to clearly state their intentions to exempt 
“the full fair market value of the property.” Memorandum from the Honorable Eugene R. 
Wedoff, Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules to the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair 
of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 5 (Dec. 6, 2010). The Consumer and 
Forms Subcommittees are considering adding a new column for exempting the full FMV of an 
asset under which a debtor could simply place a check mark. Interview with Barbara D. Gilmore, 
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B.  Effect on Claimed Exemptions That Appreciate 
in Value and Whether the Court Rendered the 
Code’s Definition of “Value” Meaningless 
The Supreme Court did not specifically address whether a 
trustee who fails to make a timely objection to a claimed exemption 
is entitled to sell that property if its value later appreciates beyond 
the statutorily allowed exemption amount. A creditor could linger in 
the background and wait for an appreciation in value to accrue until 
it is appropriately ripe for an objection.87 The danger of this 
particular scenario is well illustrated by the bankruptcy cases In re 
Chappell88 and In re Gebhart.89 When compared to Schwab, Chappell 
and Gebhart are particularly interesting cases because they deal with 
properly valued property, rather than undervalued property.90 
In both cases, the claimed exemptions were dollar-value 
exemptions for the respective debtors’ homes. When the debtors filed 
their bankruptcy petitions, their equitable interests in their homes 
(that is, the difference between the value of their homes and the 
mortgages with which they were encumbered) were within the 
permissible homestead exemption amount.91 In Chappell, the value 
of the debtors’ home increased and, as a result, caused the debtors’ 
equitable interests in their home to increase to an amount beyond the 
allowable homestead exemption amount. The trustee did not file an 
 
Member of the Forms Subcomm., in Malibu, Cal. (Mar. 18, 2011). In effect, a trustee would be 
put on notice of the need to object within the thirty-day objection period. Assuming that the value 
of the property at issue remains within the allowable exemption amount up until the objection 
hearing and the bankruptcy court determines the allowability of the claimed exemption, the 
property should become exempt in its entirety—regardless of any appreciation thereafter. FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 4003(b)–(c). 
 87. For example, if a home is worth only $40,000, a creditor might wait until its value 
increases to an amount exceeding the relevant exemption limit. Similar situations occurred in In 
re Chappell and In re Gebhart, discussed infra. The only hope is that when the bankruptcy case is 
closed and the trustee abandons the estate’s properties and liens, the trustee cannot appear years 
later to reclaim appreciation value. Only in certain extreme circumstances, such as when the 
trustee is given incomplete or false information about the asset by the debtor, is abandonment 
revocable. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(2); see, e.g., Stoebner v. Wick (In re Wick), 276 F.3d 412 
(8th Cir. 2002). 
 88. In re Chappell, 373 B.R. 73 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). 
 89. Gebhart v. Gaughan (In re Gebhart), 621 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 90. In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1208–09. 
 91. Id. The debtors in Chappell claimed a homestead exemption pursuant to the federal 
exemption under § 522(d); whereas the debtors in Gebhart exempted under Arizona state 
exemption statutes, id., which is permissible because Congress allowed states to opt out of the 
federal exemption scheme. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)–(3) (2006). 
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objection within thirty days of the conclusion of the creditors’ 
meeting but still sought to obtain the value of the home that went 
beyond the statutorily allowed exemption amount.92 Similarly in 
Gebhart, the debtor claimed a dollar-value exemption in his home. 
He had lived in his home for five years after filing for bankruptcy, 
had paid his mortgage during that time, and had believed that his 
bankruptcy was finished when he received his discharge.93 However, 
after the value of his home increased to a value beyond the 
exemption amount allowed by the exemption statute, the trustee 
sought to sell the property—after leaving the case open for eighteen 
months without any activity.94 
The Ninth Circuit addressed two consolidated appeals from 
Chappell and Gebhart.95 Relying on the recently decided Supreme 
Court decision in Schwab, the Ninth Circuit held that the debtors had 
claimed only an interest in the property and were therefore only 
entitled to that amount.96 Accordingly, the trustees were entitled to 
auction off the homes and use the postpetition appreciation of the 
homes to pay the creditors.97 
These cases cast light on Reilly’s argument that the Court’s 
interpretation of the exemption statutes renders the Code’s definition 
of “value” meaningless. “Value,” as defined in the Code, is the “fair 
market value as of the date of the filing of the petition.”98 The Court 
reasoned, however, that a debtor’s estimated value as of the petition 
date is not meaningless as it can be used to assist the trustee in 
identifying assets that may have value beyond the amount the debtor 
claims as exempt.99 Nonetheless, in a case similar to Chappell and 
Gebhart, the critical time for valuation would be when a trustee 
objects to a debtor’s claimed homestead exemption on the ground 
 
 92. In re Chappell, 373 B.R. at 76. 
 93. In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1211. 
 94. Though the trustee in Gebhart waited until after eighteen months of inactivity in the 
bankruptcy matter, debtors might be able to rely on the doctrine of estoppel to prevent a trustee 
from auctioning off their homes for postpetition appreciation. The debtor in Gebhart asserted this 
claim but did not prevail on the estoppel argument. The Ninth Circuit advised that a trustee has a 
duty to administer a bankruptcy expeditiously but that if he failed to do so, then the remedy lies 
with the U.S. Trustee’s office and not with the courts. Id. at 1212. 
 95. Id. at 1206. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 99. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2010). 
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that it exceeds the statutory limit. In that vein, it seems that with 
respect to exemptions, the point at which the value of property is 
truly meaningful is not “at the time of petition” as § 522(a)(2) might 
suggest. 
C.  Implications and Validity of the “100% of FMV” Solution 
In situations similar to Chappell and Gebhart, Chapter 7 debtors 
must understand that listing a dollar value as exempt does not 
effectively exempt the property itself. This is especially important if 
keeping certain property is a necessary condition to the debtor’s fresh 
start.100 The Supreme Court suggests that debtors who wish to 
exempt a property in-kind from the bankruptcy estate should list the 
full fair market value as their claimed exemption.101 Under this 
theory, listing the full fair market value of a home as the claimed 
exemption obligates a trustee to timely object if he or she wants to 
stop a debtor from potentially claiming a home in-kind rather than 
claiming an interest in the home.102 If after the thirty-day window the 
value of the home is still within the permissible exemption amount, 
then regardless of the value of the home at any point during the 
bankruptcy case, the homestead itself should be exempt.103 
However, the validity of the full-fair-market-value solution 
should be a cause of concern. In suggesting that debtors list full fair 
market value in the column designating the value of their claimed 
exemption to exempt the property itself, the Court has provided a 
means for debtors to exempt more than they are statutorily allowed 
to.104 With respect to homestead exemptions, this means that debtors 
could potentially obtain postpetition appreciation in real property that 
they otherwise would not be permitted to get.105 In California, for 
example, the bankruptcy estate is ordinarily entitled to postpetition 
appreciation in the property’s value, a portion of which would 
otherwise be exempt.106 The rationale is that the law places a cap on 
 
 100. One of the primary purposes of allowing a debtor to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy is to 
gain a fresh start. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). 
 101. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 102. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003. 
 103. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2668. The trustee, or objecting party, has the burden of proving 
that the exemptions are not properly claimed. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(c). 
 104. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 105. See infra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. 
 106. See In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Alsberg v. Robertson (In 
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exemptions and therefore does not allow debtors to obtain 
exemptions in amounts above that to which they are permitted by 
statute.107 California exemption statutes, and most other state 
exemption statutes, are similar to federal exemption statutes in that 
they generally permit debtors to exempt certain property up to 
specified amounts.108 
The Court’s full-fair-market-value solution appears inconsistent 
with the Court’s own rationale for determining the definition of 
property claimed as exempt. The Court looked to the statute’s 
language and reasoned that the object at which the objection is 
directed is property “claimed as exempt under subsection (b),” that 
is, exemptions within the statutorily allowed exemption limits.109 The 
Court did not explain whether claiming an asset’s full fair market 
value even fits subsection (b)’s statutory language, let alone any of 
the language in § 522. Indeed, the statute does not lend such an 
option to debtors in the first place.110 As phrased, the language of the 
exemption-related rules reflects that the property claimed cannot be 
anything other than what the statute allows—the debtor’s “aggregate 
interest in any property.”111 There is a disconnect, then, between the 
Court’s principal conclusion and its full-fair-market-value solution. 
Under the plain-meaning doctrine, statutory analysis should 
begin and end with the language of the statute when that language is 
plain.112 Absent any “indication that doing so would frustrate 
Congress’s clear intention or yield patent absurdity, [a court’s] 
obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it.”113 In the 
bankruptcy context, exemptions “allow an individual debtor to keep 
 
re Alsberg), 68 F.3d 312, 314–15 (9th Cir. 1995)); Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 940 F.2d 
1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991); Viet Vu v. Kendall (In re Viet Vu), 245 B.R. 644, 647–48 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 2000). 
 107. See Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F.2d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
debtors should be given exemptions in the amount guaranteed by statute, “regardless of the 
vicissitudes of the real estate market or timing of the sale”); In re Reed, 940 F.2d at 1321 
(“California does not permit a debtor to exempt his entire interest in a homestead, but specifically 
limits the dollar amount up to which a homestead exemption can be claimed.”) (citing CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 704.730(a) (West 2010)). 
 108. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1101(A) (2011); CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.730. 
 109. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661–63. 
 110. See 11 U.S.C. § 522. 
 111. Id. § 522(d). 
 112. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). 
 113. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 570 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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some property after the bankruptcy with which to preserve at least a 
minimal standard of living and to reenter the economy in a 
productive role rather than being cast out from it.”114 Thus, the tenet 
underlying bankruptcy law is to give debtors a fresh start, not to 
provide a head start or to provide the same level of comfort to a 
debtor as that to which he or she was accustomed. In a sense, the 
full-fair-market-value solution frustrates Congress’s clear intention 
of providing the debtor with a fresh start that is obviously meant to 
be limited by § 522(b).115 Under the Court’s theory regarding its full-
fair-market-value solution, property can become exempt regardless 
of its ultimate value.116 As such, exempting property in an amount 
that falls outside of the statutory maximum is impermissible because 
doing so would counter Congress’s intent. 
Thus, to the extent that claiming an asset’s full fair market value 
as exempt is incompatible with exemption statutes, individual 
debtors should consider turning to Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions if 
they wish to exempt their homes (or any other property important to 
them) in-kind.117 One of the fundamental characteristics of Chapter 7 
cases is the liquidation of the debtor’s assets, save for those that are 
exempted, in order to receive a discharge that releases the debtor 
from all future payments toward prepetition debts owed.118 However, 
Chapter 13 cases differ from Chapter 7 cases in that they allow 
debtors who have regular sources of income to undergo financial 
reorganization through court-approved plans rather than liquidating 
their assets.119 Accordingly, debtors can avoid liquidating their homes 
by setting up repayment plans at rates the courts determine the 
debtors can afford.120 
 
 114. Richard E. Mendales, Rethinking Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 40 B.C. L. REV. 851, 851 
(1999) (emphasis added). 
 115. See Frank J. Spirak, Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
399, 403–04 (1982) (“The more property in the bankruptcy estate, the smaller creditors’ losses 
will be. Thus, one bankruptcy policy is to maximize the property in the estate to lessen creditors’ 
losses.”). 
 116. See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2010). 
 117. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330 (2006) (discussing aspects of a Chapter 13 
proceeding). Debtors can either file under Chapter 13 at the outset or, if a debtor has already filed 
under Chapter 7 (such as the debtors in In re Chappell and In re Gebhart), convert his Chapter 7 
case to a Chapter 13 case. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), 706(a), 706(c), 707(b) (2006). 
 118. Spirak, supra note 115, at 403–04. 
 119. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a). 
 120. Id. § 1325(a)(6). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In short, the Court instituted a clear rule regarding the 
interpretation of exemption schedules. The decision is likely to result 
in the clear administration of bankruptcy estates because of the 
bright-line rule regarding the application of the exemption rules 
(making the subjective intent of the debtor irrelevant to interpreting 
exemption schedules). The Court’s decision was a fair and 
reasonable interpretation of the exemption-related statutes in light of 
the exemption rules’ purpose and function. Debtors are prejudiced 
only by the amount that they are not statutorily permitted to retain in 
the first place. The biggest concern with the Court’s decision, 
however, is that while it is grounded in the principle that a debtor is 
allowed to have a fresh start within the limits imposed by § 522 with 
respect to exemptions, its 100-percent-of-FMV solution is not 
grounded in that principle. 
 
